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Graph Searching Problems with the Counteraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–12
V.Y. Andrianov, N.N. Petrov
Abstract
The main problem in the graph searching theory is to find (in the framework
of some formalization) the search number of the graph, i.e., the minimum number
of pursuers (searchers) needed ”to catch” the invisible evader (the fugitive). In the
present paper theorems on search problems with ”the counteraction” are surveyed.
The counteraction means following: under appropriate conditions the evader can
”destroy” a pursuer. At this moment the evader becomes ”visible” for pursuers
and they may use this information in the future. The problem with the additional
condition, when the evader must remove a pursuer at the first opportunity, and the
problem with prescribed duration are considered. The sketch of the proof of the
result concerning cycles is presented. A chess problem with ”the invisible” Black’s
King is investigated as a graph searching problem under some additional conditions
defined by chess rules.
Competition for Staff between Two Departments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13–26
V.J.Baston, A.Y. Garnaev
Abstract
In this paper the following scenario is analyzed from a game-theoretical point
of view. Two departments in a large organization are each seeking to make an
appointment within the same area of expertise, for instance, a computer science
specialist. To avoid duplication it has been decided that the heads of the two de-
partments should together interview the applicants in turn and make their decisions
on one applicant before interviewing any others. If a candidate is rejected by both
departmental heads, the candidate cannot be considered for either post at a later
date. If both heads decide to make an offer two cases are considered: (a) the de-
partments are equally attractive so that an applicant has no preference between
them (b) one department can offer better prospects to applicants who will always
choose that department. The departmental heads know that there are precisely n
applicants and that each applicant has an expertise which is random over a known
range. If no appointment is made to a department from these n applicants, then the
department will suffer from a shortfall of expertise. In the paper it will be shown
that that the games (a) and (b) have very different characteristics. The game (b) is
straightforward to analyze because it has just one Nash equilibrium. On the other
hand, game (a) has many this game has many Nash equilibria and this raises the
question of equilibrium selection. We will argue that there are comparatively few
natural ones and show that it is reasonable to have several Nash equilibrium solu-
tions as different dynamics within the firm can result in different outcomes. Thus,
if one departmental head is aggressive and one passive, we might expect a different
outcome to one in which both are of a similar temperament. In the former case we
would not necessarily expect a symmetric outcome even though the scenario does
not give one player an advantage over the other. Thus, although it may be natural
to expect a solution of (a) to be symmetric, we will also investigate non-symmetric
solutions. These non-symmetric equilibria have the advantage that the players have
pure actions whereas, in our symmetric solution, the players are called upon to
employ actions with complicated probabilities.
A Competitive Prediction Number Game Under Unsymmetrical Condi-
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27–36
D.V. Belkovskii, A.Y. Garnaev
Abstract
The paper deals with a generalization of a Prediction Number Game suggested
by Sakaguchi and Szajowski (1996) in the case of unsymmetrical conditions. Two
players want to guess a realization of a random variable ? whose continuous dis-
tribution is known to both of them. The winner is that player who has chosen a
value greater than that chosen by his opponent but smaller than the realization of
? (if both players choose a value larger than ? then the game ends in a draw). The
player’s payoff depends on whether her opponent overestimated the realization of
? or not. Both the obvious zero-sum and nonzero-sum variants of such a game are
analyzed. Finally the case is considered when the different payoffs also depend on
the player. General results are presented, as well as examples for the case when ?
has uniform or exponential distribution. When the payoffs are the same for both
players, in the case of zero-sum games, the result describes a unique equilibrium in
mixed strategies. For nonzero-sum games, there is a unique Nash equilibrium and
both players have the same optimal strategy. A condition for the existence of a
Nash equilibrium in the case when each player has specific payoffs is described.
Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot under Precommitment . . . . . 37–45
M. Breton, A. Turki, G. Zaccour
Abstract
A differentiated duopoly where firms produce differentiated but not substitutable
goods and invest in research and development (R&D) to reduce their production
cost is considered. The objective of this paper is to derive and compare Bertrand
and Cournot equilibria. The model is symmetric i.e. all parameters involved in the
model are the same for both players. This assumption allows to compare Bertrand
and Cournot equilibria in a setting where any difference would be due to the choice
of the strategic variables and nothing else. A one stage game is analyzed: firms
choose R&D and price (in Bertrand game) or quantity (in Cournot game) at the
same time. The general conclusion is that including process R&D as an additional
strategic variable in a duopoly game will not change the standard result, namely
that Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition. The result
holds true for any positive levels of product differentiation and industry spillover
and independently of the form of the investment cost function.
One Approach to Solution of Complex Game Problems for Some Quasi-
linear Evolutionary Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47–55
G.Ts. Chikrii
Abstract
Nowadays, certain interest has been shown to the model that describes interac-
tion of two types of the players ”predator - prey”. In this study, we consider the
problem of pursuit for a system with Volterra evolution under the assumption of
variable time-delay of information on the evaders behavior. In previous research, it
is shown that just as in the case of differential dynamics this problem is equivalent
to a certain perfect-information game with some changes both in the dynamics and
the terminal set. On the one hand, this equivalence makes it feasible in the case
of delayed information to apply the methods, developed for the games with perfect
information. In this paper we apply the First Pontryagin Method. On the other
hand, on the basis of this equivalence an approach to solution of perfect-information
games of pursuit, for which fundamental Pontryagins condition fails, is developed.
This approach allow to transform the original game with perfect information to an
auxiliary one with special kind information delay and subsequent analysis of the
game, equivalent to the latter.
A Differential Game with Investment in Transport and Communication
in R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57–70
L. Colombo, L. Lambertini and A. Mantovani
Abstract
Differential game where firms invest to increase the percentage of the product
that arrives at destination is proposed. Although several applications of differential
games can be found in different fields of industrial organization, and the problem of
transport and communication technology research and development (TCRD) invest-
ments has never been considered in such a framework. A dynamic model of duopoly
with differentiated products where firms compete either in prices or in quantities in
a unique market and invest in TCRD is presented. Alternatively, as usual in the
international trade literature, one can think of two firms located in different coun-
tries that export to a third market. Both open-loop and closed loop Nash equilibria,
with attention to closed loop ones are considered. Finally, the solutions emerging
from the two market settings against the social optimum are assessed and they are
proceeded with a welfare appraisal. This allows one to draw some conclusions on
the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies. In particular, in line with the
existing literature, it is proved that Bertrand competition yields the socially optimal
amount of TCRD effort, while Cournot competition involves excess investment.
Time-Consistency and the Problem of Minimal Reduction . . . . . . 71–86
M. Dementieva, P. Neittaanmaki and V. Zakharov
Abstract
In the paper, cooperative utility games (TU-games) are investigated. The prob-
lem of minimal reduction is investigated for the regularization of dynamic TU-games.
This problem is considered in two ways. The first approach is based upon the fact
that to regularize the original game it is natural to remove a coalition from the
collection of the disturber players. Developing this approach the notion of condi-
tionally minimal coalition was introduced and investigated. The second approach is
based on the observation that the minimal coalition in a general case could be less
(in terms of number of players) than the conditionally minimal coalition. Along this
line, the acceptable coalitions are discussed. One important problem in dynamic co-
operative games is a time-consistency of a solution. In the paper a Davis-Maschler
reduced game is modified to a dynamic case to get time-consistent imputations
from the core. The paper contains the illustrative example of the practical use of a
minimal reduction to provide time-consistency of the imputation from the core of a
multistage cooperative TU-game.
Conjugate-set Game for a Nonlinear Programming Problem . . . . 87–95
H. Kawasaki
Abstract
The conjugate point is a global concept in the calculus of variations. It plays
a crucial role to guarantee optimality. Recently, a conjugate point theory was pro-
posed for a minimization problem of a smooth function with n variables, which
matches Jacobi’s classical conjugate point theory. In either theory, collaboration of
variables is essential. Namely, even when a couple of variables cannot improve a
solution, collaboration of several variables may find a better solution. If such a set
of variables exists, it is called a strict conjugate set. Then a simple question arises.
How much does each variable of the strict conjugate set contribute to improve the
solution? The aims of this paper are to emphasize a game-theoretic aspect of the
conjugate point and to give an answer to the above question. To achieve the aims,
a cooperative game based on conjugate sets is defined. It is called the conjugate-set
game. Furthermore, the Shapley value for the conjugate-set game is computed.
A Concept of Solution for a Strategic Cooperative Game Involving Un-
known Parameteres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97–114
M. Larbani, Y. Askoura
Abstract
The problem of decision making involving unknown parameters and more than
one decision maker in conflict is, generally, considered in the context of the the-
ory of games with incomplete information. In previous study, the concept of NS-
equilibrium for a non cooperative n-person game under uncertainty. This concept
is based on the concept of Nash equilibrium and the notion of weak Pareto optimal
solution of a multiple criteria optimization problem. In this paper, following the
Zhukovskiis approach, we introduce the concept of aw- equilibrium for an n-person
cooperative strategic game under uncertainty in the case of CI. This concept is a
generalization of the concept of ZS-equilibrium. Indeed, in addition to the properties
of the ZS-equilibrium, it is stable against the deviation of any coalition of players i.e.
if any coalition of players deviates from its strategy in the aw-equilibrium, the re-
maining players can punish it. We described some properties of the aw-equilibrium
and provided sufficient conditions for its existence through the theorem. From the
theorem an adequate procedure for the practical determination of this equilibrium
for two special classes of games is followed. In future the problem of the existence of
aw-equilibrium when the payoff functions are of the general form may be a potential
direction of research.
A Fishery Game Model with Migration:
Reserved Territory Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115–127
V.V. Mazalov, A.N. Rettieva
Abstract
A dynamic game model of a bioresource management problem (fisheries) is con-
sidered. The center (state) which determines the reserved portion of the reservoir
(where fishing is prohibited), and the players (fishing farms) which harvest fish are
the participants of the game. Each player is an independent decision maker, guided
by the considerations of maximizing the profit from fish sale. We consider finite
and infinite planning horizon. Pontryagin’s maximal principle and Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation were applied to determine Nash and Stakelberg equlibriums.
Repeated Game with Constrant on the Time of Observation . 129–139
E.Z. Mokhonko
Abstract
Let the equilibrium situation exist in some repeated game if the continuous
observation for actions of partner is possible. This situation can disappear if the
time of possible observation becomes less than the duration of the game. In the
paper the situation of equilibrium which is born by the strategies of fixed type is
considered. The changes of the set of all such situations are researched when the
time of observation is changed from zero to maximum value.
Value for the Game with Changing Coalitional Structure . . . . . 141–152
L.A. Petrosjan, S.I. Mamkina
Abstract
The paper examines a game in an extensive form with perfect information in
which coalitional structures may change in fixed nodes. Each player makes his deci-
sion based on the coalition to which he belongs aiming to maximize its payoff. Using
dynamic programming technique, a new solution, the indifferent Nash equilibrium
is constructed resulting in the PMS-value. PMS-value is a two-stage solution in
which coalitions are acting as individual players using indifferent Nash equilibrium
strategies (which are defined in the unique way) and players inside the coalition play
cooperatively allocating the common joint payoff according to the Shapley value. A
numerical example illustrates theoretical results.
The Redistribution Paradox and the Paradox of New Members in the
German Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153–174
A. Rusinowska, A. van Deemen
Abstract
In the paper fifteen German elections are analyzed and scrutinized on the occur-
rence of modified versions of the paradox of redistribution and the paradox of new
members. The frequencies of the appearance of these paradoxes are calculated. It
is checked how frequently the power indices agree and disagree in the cases in which
these paradoxes occur. The frequencies calculated for the German data with the
frequencies of the occurrence of the same paradoxes for the Dutch elections (Van
Deemen and Rusinowska 2003) are compared.
Three-player Game of ”Keep-or-Exchange” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175–189
M. Sakaguchi
Abstract
A three-player, sequential-move game with imperfect information is analyzed
and the explicit solution is given. This work is the first extension of the present
authors recent paper (2003) to the three player games. The solution derived is
surprisingly complicate in comparison with the one for the two player game. Our
intuition, that the last-mover has an advantage over the middle-mover, and the
middle-mover, in turn, has an advantage over the first mover, is proven to correct.
Three-player simultaneous-move game is also solved. A conjecture for the solution
to the four-player game is given.
Infinitely Repeated Symmetric 2×2-Bimatrix Games with Finite Memory
of Players Graph Searching Problems with the Counteraction 191–212
A.A. Semenishchev
Abstract
Bimatrix games provide the simplest models for non-antagonistic interaction of
two agents maximizing their personal profits. For this reason the games are of great
interest for specialists in the biology, psychology, economics and social sciences.
Besides, bimatrix games constitute the basis for more sophisticated models such
as iterated games, evolutionary games, cooperative games etc. In the paper the
infinitely repeated game based upon a symmetric 2×2 bimatrix game is considered.
The strategies of the players having a finite memory are analyzed; the algorithms
of finding the Nash equilibria and Stackelberg solutions are suggested.
Nonsymmetric Consistent Surplus Sharing Methods . . . . . . . . . 213–230
E. Yanovskaya
Abstract
A surplus sharing problem (SSP) is a problem of dividing the proceed of a coop-
erative venture among several agents. The latters are provided with their (nonneg-
ative) opportunity costs whose sum is less that the total surplus. A surplus sharing
method (SSM) associates with every SSP a nonnegative surplus for each agent. The
SSMs are characterized by their properties formulated as axioms. There is a nice
characterization due to Young (1987) of parametric cost allocation methods which
holds also for surplus sharing methods with help of continuity, symmetry, and con-
sistency. In the paper this result is extended to nonsymmetric strict monotonous
SSMs. Moreover, the addition of the axioms path independence and strong cost
monotonicity gives a characterization of equal gains methods.
